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Abstract
In this work, we aim to present an optimization model for vaccine pricing in
a two-economy duopoly. This model observes the price dynamics between a
high income country and a low income country that procure vaccinations
through PAHO. This model is formulated to provide insights on optimal
pricing strategy for PAHO to ultimately increase vaccine accessibility to low
income countries. The objective is to satisfy the public demand at the lowest
price possible, while providing enough profit for the vaccine manufacturers
to stay in business. Using non-linear integer programming, the model results
show that cross-subsidization occurs in PAHO vaccine procurement.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
The development of vaccines has been one of the most successful public
health instruments of the past century. Implementation of vaccines prevents
approximately 2.5 million child deaths around the globe annually as well
as millions of more diseases and illnesses (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2014). It has successfully eradicated several diseases, such as
smallpox, saving millions of lives annually.
The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) is an international
public health agency serving as the regional office for the Americas of
the World Health Organization (WHO). With the establishment of PAHO
Revolving Fund (RF), PAHO has been serving as a vaccine procurement
agent on behalf of 41 member countries and territories in the Caribbean
and Latin America, delivering 211 million doses as well as managing a
pediatric vaccine program responsible for 8.2 million births annually. PAHO
is responsible for the negotiation process between the member states and
the suppliers for vaccine products. In 2019, RF is working with more than
120 million USD on global immunization. RF creates economies of scale
and achieves a strong purchasing power through buying in bulk at the
lowest price. According to WHO’s Global Vaccine Market Report in 2018,
the procurement mechanism has an evident benefit on price. Compared to
the self-procured vaccinations, vaccines delivered through PAHO RF are
around 48% lower in price per dose (World Health Organization, 2019).
Because PAHO expands the market size by purchasing large amounts of
vaccines and distributing at a lower cost for national vaccination programs,
PAHO has significant leverage in negotiating the price from the manufacturers. While procuring millions of vaccinations for many countries at a lower
cost, PAHO must stay within each nation’s vaccination budget, and guarantee
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a satisfactory profit for the manufacturers to stay in business. With these
constraints, we ask the question: From a public organization’s perspective,
specifically PAHO in this case, what are the best pricing decisions for these
vaccinations, while meeting all the aforementioned requirements? Moreover,
how does vaccination procurement for multiple countries affect the pricing
dynamics?
In this context, the framework of game theory is appropriate. The study
of game theory entails a mathematical method of decision-making between
several parties or players to obtain an optimal, or the "best" solution. The
players of the game include manufacturers that produce vaccinations and
PAHO who purchases the vaccinations from these manufacturers. The
objective of the game is to gain practical insights for optimal pricing strategy
for PAHO, while satisfying the specific constraints.
We utilize non-linear integer programming, a type of mathematical programming, to obtain the solution to this problem. The non-linearity comes
from the objective function and its constraints. Mathematical programming is a
technique for identifying a function-maximizing solution over a constrained
set of feasible values. A model for mathematical programming would
be comprised of decision variables representing the problem, an objective
function describing the quality of the solutions, and constraints. For this
particular problem, the goal is to develop a mathematical program that
incorporates the government, or PAHO, as an active player in the vaccination
pricing game.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the detailed
background and motivation for this study. In addition, it includes relevant
game theory concepts, frameworks as well as previous research that help
set up the foundation for the developing model. Chapter 3 presents the
optimization model. Chapter 4 is the application of the optimization model
to a real case study in order to validate the model. Chapter 5 discusses
the results of the case study from the previous chapter. Chapter 6 is the
conclusion and it discusses limitations of the model and further studies.

Chapter 2

Background
This chapter provides the background information pertinent to the study.
Section 2.1 delineates the annual vaccination procurement process for PAHO.
Section 2.2 explains some key game theory frameworks that are applied
to the model. Lastly, Section 2.3 provides brief summaries of the previous
studies that offer foundations for my model.

2.1

PAHO’s Vaccination Procurement Process

Through its annual vaccine and syringe demand forecasting, PAHO RF
consolidates the requirements for all participating states into one regional
order for each vaccination (PAHO, 2019b). This way, the suppliers are
presented with a bulk order for the products, making the bidding process
more effective. All prices offered by the suppliers are averaged for each
product to maintain equity and reported to the member states. This allows
the member states to secure their national vaccine procurement budgets by
offering the lowest price possible for every product. In order to guarantee a
timely and sustainable supply, PAHO selects at least two suppliers based on
the quantity and the lowest price offered in the bidding process as well as
the the supplier’s quality and service record. It also takes into consideration
if the selection will promote competition and will not interfere with other
national programs (PAHO, 2019a). As the vaccination market is dominated
by only few manufacturers, the selection of manufacturers and vaccine prices
are crucial to mitigating the high risk of monopolies, which may lead to
unreasonable price increase in the vaccines.
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2.2

Game Theory

Oligopoly theory is the study of the markets dominated by a small number of
sellers. This field can be well-applied to the vaccination market in which
only few big manufacturers comprise the game. In this work, we analyze
a duopoly in which there are only two manufacturers for the game. When
the firms are making simultaneous decisions - rather than sequential - to
maximize their own profit, the game can be modelled as either a Bertrand
game or a Cournot game (Yue et al., 2006). While the decision variable in a
Cournot game is the quantity, a Bertrand game treats the price as a strategic
variable.
The vaccination market, specifically the pricing of vaccinations, has
been analyzed in various ways through research and optimization. The
pricing system was initially analyzed in a static Bertrand oligopoly game in
(Robbins et al., 2010). The Bertrand game is a good framework for modelling
vaccination pricing as the vaccination prices are newly negotiated every year
prior to the purchase (Robbins et al., 2010). However, the Bertrand game
does entail three assumptions: first, it assumes unlimited manufacturing
capacities, meaning that each manufacturer can satisfy all of market demands.
The second assumption is no product differentiation. In other words, all
products are interchangeable and substitutable. Lastly, it assumes a game in
a static competition, which refers to a single independent interaction between
the manufacturers, and the choices of a manufacturer does not influence
that of others (Behzad and Jacobson, 2016).
These assumptions do not always hold in a practical application in
the market. In order to eliminate these unrealistic constraints, a BertrandEdgeworth-Chamberlin competition is introduced. A Bertrand-Edgeworth game
describes the price game of a duopoly in which two manufacturers have
limited capacity, relaxing the first assumption. A Chamberlin competition
allows for non-homogeneous products, as is the case for the pediatric vaccine
market. To summarize, the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin competition
relaxes the first two assumptions of the Bertrand model, and thus reflects the
realistic conditions of the pediatric vaccination market. A Nash equilibrium
is an optimal solution to the game in which no player has an incentive to
deviate from the initial strategy.

Previous Work and Motivation for the Extended Study

2.3

Previous Work and Motivation for the Extended
Study

Previous work by Behzad et al. (2015) examine the U.S. pediatric vaccine
market using the Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin framework. The research
captures the existence of a unique equilibrium in a market with symmetric
and capacity-constrained manufacturers. The symmetry in manufacturing
capacities refers to equal production capacities in all manufacturers. The
study also assumes a linear demand curve for each market where the product
prices and purchased quantities are inversely proportional. The product is
also limited to monovalent vaccines - rather than combination vaccines - which
immunize against exactly one pathogen. Because the combination vaccines
in the market do not necessarily immunize against the same set of multiple
pathogens, this study does not include the analysis for combination vaccines.
Behzad et al. proceed to apply the equilibrium in three different scenarios
in the vaccine market. The research continues and successfully eliminates
its constraints of symmetry, rendering the model applicable to asymmetric
manufacturing capacities (Behzad and Jacobson, 2016). The study concludes
that there exist three Nash equilibria that fully capture the optimal behavior
of two firms in a duopoly.
The work by Cummings et al. (2019) extend this model by directly incorporating the government as a player in the game. The work addresses how
the U.S. government can ensure the cost-effective procurement of pediatric
vaccinations to all U.S. children who acquire their vaccines through publicly
funded health insurance (Cummings et al., 2019). The study concludes that
vaccine products with higher differentiability segment markets in a positive
way. Moreover, markets are at lower risk when high capacity manufacturers
have moderate target profits. The study also considers scenarios in which
CDC may be able to prevent monopolies through financial incentives to
manufacturers.
As Cummings et al. (2019) observe the vaccine market strictly within
the U.S., this paper extends the model to international markets in which
different countries operate through one procurement agent, namely PAHO.
The model observes the dynamics of vaccine pricing between a low income
country and a high income country from the procurer’s perspective. The
insights drawn from this study will provide agencies such as PAHO with
better knowledge in pricing trends, used to maximize cost-efficiency for its
member countries. Consequently, it may contribute to increasing vaccine
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accessibility for low income countries.

Chapter 3

The Price Negotiation Problem
This chapter presents the optimization problem in more depth. Section 3.1
first introduces the extended parameters and variables from Cummings
et al. (2019). Using these parameters and variables, Section 3.2 presents the
optimization model for the public sector with its objective function subject
to various constraints.

3.1

Variables and Parameters

The variables and parameters presented in this section are based on the
work of Cummings et al. (2019), with modifications to account for the
two-economy framework.
Both manufacturers m ∈ M produce vaccines for both a high income
country and a low income country, i ∈ I, in which each country has a public
s
s
sector and a private sector. p mi
and q mi
represent the prices charged and
quantities produced by manufacturer m for each sector s in country i ∈ I.
As the model is formed from PAHO’s perspective to optimize the prices and
quantities in the public sectors of a high-income country and a low-income
pub
pub
country, the public prices p mi and quantities q mi are treated as a variable,
priv

priv

while the private prices p mi and quantities q mi are treated as parameters
that will be determined later from the given data. z is the absolute difference
in two prices charged for each public sector in country i ∈ I. Along with
the parameter µ in [0, 1], z weighs solutions that have a smaller absolute
price difference, as shown in the objective function. The parameter µ ∈ [0, 1]
weighs the optimal solutions that have a smaller z to be more important.
Then, we have a set of parameters required for the model. γ represents
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the product similarity for two products, in which 0 means the two brands are
completely different and 1 means the two are completely identical. Some of
the factors that determine the product similarity constant include associated
histories of medically adverse events, side effects, existence of alternatives,
availability and brand loyalty. Note that previous models call it the product
differentiation.
Di is the total demand of the vaccine from both public and private
sectors in country i ∈ I. Furthermore, we assume that each sector operates
under a linear direct demand curve as will be shown in constraint (4) of
the optimization model. a is , b i , c i are the demand curve coefficients for the
linear direct demand curve in each sector s ∈ S in country i inI.
Pm is the minimum profit threshold for each manufacturer m in M to
ensure that the company can stay in business after considering its research
and development (R&D) costs. The production costs are negligible in
determining the minimum target profit as the initial R&D costs for the
vaccine significantly outweigh the production costs. (Cummings et al., 2019).
K m is the total production capacity for each manufacturer m ∈ M. Then, the
parameter U i is the lower bounds for the private sector capacity in country
i ∈ I. A threshold for the minimum quantities in the private sectors is
needed in order for the price dynamics between two sectors to hold. It will
be further explained in discussion of the constraint (7) of the optimization
model. Lastly, G i is the national GDP for each country i ∈ I. This constant is
used to normalize the price difference in the public sector, z, as shown in
constraint (1). x i is the percentage of vaccines administered in the public
sector of country i ∈ I, normalized in the range of [0,1] by dividing by 100.
Conversely, 1 − x i entails the proportion of vaccines administered in the
private sector.
Refer to Table 3.1 for the summary of the relevant set, variables, and
parameters for the model.

Variables and Parameters

Table 3.1

Parameters and variables

Name

Type

Meaning

M

set

manufacturers {m,n}

S

set

sectors {public, private}

I

set

buyer country based on income level {high,low}

s
p mi

variable

prices charged by m ∈ M for sector s ∈ S in I

s
q mi

variable

quantities produced m ∈ M for sector s ∈ S in I

z

variable

difference between two prices for public sector in i ∈ I

γ

parameter

product similarity

Di

parameter

total demand for country i ∈ I

a is , b i , c i

parameters

demand curve coefficients for s ∈ S in I

µ

parameter

objective function weight

Pm

parameter

minimum profit threshold for m ∈ M

Km

parameter

total production capacity in m ∈ M

Ui

parameter

private sector capacity lower bound for surplus for i ∈ I

Gi

parameter

national GDP for i ∈ I

xi

parameter

percentage of vaccination fulfilled in public sector in i in I normalized to [0,1]
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3.2

Optimization Model

Using the parameters and variables above, we extend the optimization model
of Cummings et al. (2019) as follows:
objective function: minimize µ(

Õ

pub

pub

q mi · p mi ) + (1 − µ)z

(1)

i ∈ I, m, n ∈ M, m , n

(2)

i∈I

(3)

pub

m, n ∈ M, m , n, i ∈ I

(4)

s
s
q mi
· p mi
≥ Pm

m∈M

(5)

m∈M

(6)

m ∈ M, i ∈ I

(7)

m∈M,i∈I

pub

subject to

z≥

Õ

pub

p mi − p ni
Gi
pub

q mi ≥ x i Di

m∈M
pub

pub

pub

q mi + bp mi − cp ni  a i

Õ
s∈S,i∈I

Õ

s
≤ Km
q mi

s∈S,i∈I

Km −

Õ

pub

q mi ≥ U i

i∈I

The objective of this model is to minimize the total cost for both public
sectors in two countries. The total cost is given by the quantities sold in
two public sectors multiplied by the price in the public sectors. Because
the observed public sector prices tend to be not too different between the
manufacturers, a realistic solution would return two public sector prices to
be as similar as possible (Cummings et al., 2019). The objective function
given by constraint (1) achieves this goal by using the weighting parameter
µ. As shown in constraint (2), the price difference in the two public sectors is
divided by the national GDP in order to balance the income disparity in two
different countries. When µ is sufficiently large, within the range of (0, 1),
the objective function returns a solution that prioritizes a small absolute
price difference.

Optimization Model
The total vaccine quantity for the public sectors is obtained by multiplying
the proportion of vaccinations administered in public sector x i by the total
demand Di . All children in the country should receive the required dosage
of any particular vaccine. Hence, the total quantity of vaccines produced
for the public sector should be at least as large as x i Di . However, we let
x i Di be the lower bound of the total quantity for public sectors in order
to ensure the prevention of vaccine shortages (Cummings et al., 2019). It
additionally provides some model flexibility for the demand estimation
method described in later sections. This constraint is shown in constraint (3).
As mentioned earlier, we assume each sector operates under a linear
direct demand curve given by:
s
s
s
q mi
 a is − b i p mi
+ c i p ni

m, n ∈ M, m , n, s ∈ S, i ∈ I

(8)

where a is is the demand coefficient when the vaccines are hypothetically
s
free and c i p ni
is the demand coefficient dependent on the competitor’s price.
This linear direct demand curve works as a constraint for the public sector
as stated in constraint (4).
For a given manufacturer, its overall profit is determined by both public
and private sectors of a country. We assume that PAHO wants to ensure that
manufacturers make enough profit to stay in business and thereby prevent
a monopoly. constraint (5) lets the manufacturers to at least meet the the
minimum profit threshold. Furthermore, constraint (6) entails that, for a
given manufacturer, the total quantities produced for both sectors in both
countries cannot exceed its production capacity.
Lastly, constraint (7) forces the remaining vaccines after selling in the
public sectors of both countries to exceed the minimum threshold needed
for the private sector prices and quantities to be determined by the BertrandEdgeworth-Chamberlin equilibrium. In other words, the quantities reserved
for the two public sectors define the quantities that will be allocated to the private sector. In the private sector, the manufacturers compete independently
of PAHO.
For the private sector equilibrium parameters, we use the values derived
by Behzad and Jacobson (2016) and Cummings et al. (2019):
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priv

Ui 

ai

(1 + γ)
γ

2(1 − γ)0.5
· 1−
(1 + γ0.5 )(2 − γ)




i∈I

(9)

m ∈ M, i ∈ I

(10)

m ∈ M, i ∈ I

(11)

priv

priv
p mi



priv

ai

2b i − c i
priv

q mi  b i · p mi
bi 

1
(1 + γ)(1 − γ)

i∈I

(12)

ci 

γ
 γ · bi
(1 + γ)(1 − γ)

i∈I

(13)

priv

and a i
is determined from publicly available price and demand data for
each country, as described in the next section.

Chapter 4

Case Study of DTaP
In order to validate the optimization model from Chapter 3, we apply the
model to a case study. Section 4.1 discusses the selection of appropriate
countries for the model. Section 4.2 provides background information on
DTaP, the selected vaccine for the case study. It also includes necessary
assumptions made for the model. Section 4.3 explains the process of
parameter estimation for both countries. Thereby, we set up the appropriate
conditions for the optimization model to be solved through mathematical
programming.

4.1

Selection of Appropriate Countries

We use the U.S. as a high income country case as this model is an extension
of Cummings et al. (2019)’s work, modelled for the U.S. pediatric market. For
the low income country case, Paraguay is selected. There are several reasons
for the selection: first, because we are observing the dynamics of a pricing
model within the PAHO framework, the two countries need be members
of PAHO. Although the U.S. has its own monopsonistic agent to procure
vaccines (namely the Center for Disease and Control), the country remains a
member of PAHO. For the case study, it is assumed that the U.S. procures
DTaP through PAHO. Secondly, it is necessary to have some level of GDP
disparity between two countries. Lastly, because the model incorporates
both the public sector and private sector in each country, a country with a
substantial presence of the private healthcare sector is desired.
The healthcare of Paraguay consists of the public sector, the Institute of
Social Security and the private sector (OECD Development Center, 2019).
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Even though the Institute of Social Security is often regarded as a separate
entity, in this model, it is considered as a subsystem of the public sector.
Because the exact data on the distribution of healthcare service utilization is
not available, we utilize the coverage estimations from Kieninger et al. (2015).
The coverage by each sector is estimated based on the 2008 Continuous
Household Survey, conducted by Department of Vaccines and Biological
Products of WHO. The results state that, 54.7% of the respondents received
outpatient treatment from the public sector; 13.8% from Institute or Social
Security; and lastly, 31.5% from the private sector, which includes pharmacies
and others (Kieninger et al., 2015). Since we consider the Institute of Social
Security as a subsystem of the public sector, we assume 68.5% for the
percentage of vaccine administered in the public sector and 31.5% for that of
private sector. Therefore, x i for Paraguay is 0.685.

4.2

Information on the Vaccination

As Cummings et al. (2019) consider the monovalent DTaP duopoly in the U.S.,
we select DTaP as the vaccine for our model. DTP refers to any medication
that vaccinates against diphtheria toxoid (D), tetanus toxoid (T), and acellular
pertussis (P). For DTP, there are two main types of vaccines: the first is DTwP
that contains a whole cell for the the pertussis component. Then, there is
DTaP that contains an acellular component for pertussis (Holt et al., 2016).
While some form of DTP vaccination for infants is required in most countries,
the preference of DTaP or DTwP varies depending on the country and its
national immunization program.
The U.S. is one of the many countries that includes DTaP in its pediatric
immunization schedule. In particular, the Vaccines for Children (VFC) is a
federal program through the CDC that was established in 1994 to provide
vaccines at no cost for eligible children from birth (Cummings et al., 2019).
The VFC covers a wide range of vaccinations that includes the 5-dose DTaP.
The CDC recommends DTap to all children at 2, 4, and 6 months, with
boosters at 15 through 18 months, and at 4 through 6 years (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). In the current U.S. market, there
exists a duopoly for DTaP vaccine: Infanrix produced by GlaxoSmithKline
and Daptacel produced by Sanofi Pasteur.
On the other hand, in many Latin American countries, DTwP is the most
preferred form of DTP vaccination. Paraguay implemented The Expanded
Program on Immunization (EPI), managed by the Ministry of Public Health

Estimation of Parameters
and Social Welfare of Paraguay, with its goal of making vaccinations available
to all children. This program follows the standard vaccination schedule
from PAHO/WHO and requires 2-dose DTwP for all infants, with the first
dose at 18 months of age, and the second booster at 4 years of age (Ministerio
de Salud Publica Y Bienestar Social, 2019).
In regards to the model, there are some necessary assumptions to be
made. While the model stipulates a duopoly for monovalent vaccine in the
international market, the U.S. uses DTaP and Paraguay uses DTwP. As we
cannot compare two different types of monovalent vaccines in the model, the
duopoly of DTaP between Infanrix and Daptacel is also assumed in Paraguay.
As a consequence of this assumption, the model may not accurately reflect
the market conditions in Paraguay. However, this assumption allows us to
observe the pricing dynamics of the same products in a low income country
and a high income country, achieving the goal of gaining insights on vaccine
procurement in a two-economy duopoly.

4.3

Estimation of Parameters

This section presents our estimates for the model parameters. For the case
of the U.S. market parameters, we use the same values as in Cummings
et al. (2019). We estimate the Paraguay market parameters using the same
approach as Cummings et al. (2019).

4.3.1

Estimation of Total Demand

Cummings et al. (2019) estimate the total annual demand for DTaP in the
U.S. market as the product of the number of annual births and the expected
number of DTaP doses per child. They report a 2018 estimated demand of
4.34M doses, which we use here for the U.S. market.
Using a similar method from Section 4.3.1, we now estimate the total annual demand for Paraguay. WHO/UNICEF annually publishes the national
vaccination coverage estimations, assuming the 3-dose DTP vaccination.
Paraguay’s annual DTP coverage (%) is acquired from this source (World
Health Organization, 2018). Since the data provide the estimates of only
the first dose coverage (DT1) and the third dose coverage (DT3), the second
dose coverage (DT2) is estimated to be the midpoint of DT1 and DT3. Table
4.1 presents the annual national coverage as well as the annual number of
births in Paraguay. Then, each coverage is multiplied by the annual birth
cohort to obtain the total number of doses administered for each D1,D2,
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Table 4.1 Annual DTP Coverage (%) and Number of Births in Paraguay

Year

DT1 (%)*

DT2 (%)*

DT3 (%)*

Birth**

2010

95

93

91

1.419 ×105

2011

95

93.5

92

1.418 ×105

2012

94

92.5

91

1.416 ×105

2013

97

94

91

1.415 ×105

2014

95

94

93

1.421 ×105

2015

96

94

92

1.426 ×105

2016

94

93

92

1.432 ×105

2017

95

93

91

1.437 ×105

*The annual DTP Coverage is obtained from World Health Organization
(2018).
** The annual number of births in Paraguay is obtained from the UN (2019).
D3. Lastly, the sum of number of DT1, DT2, DT3 administered in one year
yields the total number of DTP dosage. This is shown in Table 4.2. Note that
WHO/UNICEF uses different methods to estimate the national coverage,
compared to the CDC, yielding a higher expected dose per child compared
to that of the U.S.
Finally, Table 4.3 presents the total annual demand for Paraguay. Recall
from Section 4.1 that we assume the public sector of Paraguay fulfills around
68.5% of the total demand. The public sector demand was estimated by
multiplying the total demand by 68.5%. The rest is allocated to the private
sector.

Estimation of Parameters
Table 4.2

Annual Number of DTP Doses Administered

Year

DT1

DT2

DT3

Total Dose

2010

1.348 ×105

1.320 ×105

1.292 ×105

3.960 ×105

2011

1.347 ×105

1.326 ×105

1.304 ×105

3.977 ×105

2012

1.331 ×105

1.310 ×105

1.289 ×105

3.931 ×105

2013

1.372 ×105

1.330 ×105

1.287 ×105

3.989 ×105

2014

1.350 ×105

1.335 ×105

1.321 ×105

4.006 ×105

2015

1.369 ×105

1.341 ×105

1.312 ×105

4.022 ×105

2016

1.346 ×105

1.331 ×105

1.317 ×105

3.994 ×105

2017

1.365 ×105

1.336 ×105

1.307 ×105

4.008 ×105

Table 4.3 Total Demand Estimates for Paraguay

Year

Total demand

Public sector (68.5%)

Private sector (31.5%)

2010

3.960 ×105

2.712 ×105

1.247 ×105

2011

3.977 ×105

2.724 ×105

1.253 ×105

2012

3.931 ×105

2.693 ×105

1.238 ×105

2013

3.989 ×105

2.733 ×105

1.257 ×105

2014

4.006 ×105

2.755 ×105

1.258 ×105

2015

4.022 ×105

2.755 ×105

1.267 ×105

2016

3.994 ×105

2.736 ×105

1.262 ×105

2017

4.008 ×105

2.745 ×105

1.262 ×105
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4.3.2

Estimation of the Objective Function Weight

Recall from Chapter 3 that the objective function is defined as:
objective function: minimize µ(

Õ

pub

pub

q mi · p mi ) + (1 − µ)z

(1)

m∈M,i∈I

It contains the weight function µ to prioritize a solution with a smaller
manufacturer price difference. Cummings et al. (2019) obtained µ  10−4
through an empirical process, considering the order of magnitude for the cost
outputs. This value of µ reasonably prioritizes minimizing the government
costs while also finding the optimal solution that has a small price difference
z (Cummings et al., 2019).

4.3.3

Estimation of Linear Demand Coefficients

From Cummings et al. (2019), we obtain a formula to estimate the DTaP
s
s
demand curve intercepts a is from the vaccine price data. Let q mi
and p mi
y
y
be the quantity and price from sector s ∈ S in country i ∈ I, produced by
manufacturer m ∈ M, during the year y ∈ 1, ..., Y. Then, the estimate of a is
is given by the average of a isy for year 1 through Y:
a is

Y 
1Õ 1

Y
2
y1

Õ

s
q mi
y

m∈M,i∈I

105
+
2 + 2γ

Õ

s
p mi
y


s∈S

m∈M,i∈I

Using these equations, Cumming et al. (2019) approximate the linear
demand coefficient a is of the U.S. to be:
pub
a US

priv
a US









1.553
 1.365 +
× 106
1+γ
2.389
 1.030 +
× 106
1+γ

Note that for the U.S., the equations are scaled by 106 as vaccine quantities
are in the magnitude of 106 while the prices are in the magnitude of 101 .
As a reference, the U.S. prices of Infanrix and Daptacel are obtained from
Cummings et al. (2019) and are shown in Table 4.4.
Similarly, using the same method, the demand intercepts a is for Paraguay
are computed. In regards to the public sector price, PAHO annually publishes
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Table 4.4

U.S.

Annual Infanrix and Daptacel Prices in the U.S*

Public Sector

Private Sector

Year

Inf

Dap

Inf

Dap

2010

$13.75

$13.75

$21.20

$23.75

2011

$14.51

$13.25

$21.20

$24.40

2012

$15.35

$15.00

$21.20

$25.29

2013

$15.76

$15.38

$21.20

$25.98

2014

$15.76

$15.38

$21.20

$25.98

2015

$16.15

$16.04

$21.20

$27.17

2016

$16.85

$16.73

$22.40

$28.41

2017

$17.73

$17.16

$22.40

$29.20

*The annual prices for Infanrix and Daptacel in each sector of the U.S. are
obtained from Cummings et al. (2019).
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the weighted averages of the contract prices for DTaP; however, it does not
disclose the names or the number of the selected manufacturers. The
weighted averages of the annual DTaP contract prices are shown in Table
4.5. Note that the price for 2010 is an estimate from the 2011 price as PAHO
started to publish the prices in 2011. On the other hand, in regards to
the demand intercept for private sector of Paraguay, there were limitations
in obtaining the exact annual vaccine prices. Thus, as an alternative, the
average price difference (%) between the two sectors in the U.S. was applied
to extrapolate the private sector prices in Paraguay. From calculations, the
average price of DTaP in the private sector of the U.S was 65.04% more
expensive than that of public sector of the U.S. Thus, we assume the average
vaccine price in the private sector of Paraguay to be $18.39, compared to
$11.14 in the public sector. Using these values, the intercepts for Paraguay
are estimated and shown in the equations down below:

pub
a Par

priv
a Par









1.114
 1.365 +
× 105
1+γ
1.839
 0.628 +
× 105
1+γ

Similar to the previous linear demand coefficients, the equations for
Paraguay are scaled by 105 as vaccine quantities are in the magnitude of 105
while the prices are in the magnitude of 101 .

4.3.4

Estimation of Product Similarity

Recall from Chapter 3 that γ represents the product similarity for Infanrix
and Daptacel, in which 0 means the two brands are completely different and
1 means the two brands are completely identical. Some of the factors that
determine product similarity are associated histories of medically adverse
events, side effects, existence of alternatives, availability and brand loyalty.
Since some of these factors are not quantifiable, a sensitivity analysis is
conducted on the range of product similarity γ. While using γ  0.25 as
a default value, we extend the range to (0,0.5) in the analysis, following
the method from Cummings et al. (2019). This is based on the assumption
that healthcare providers can select between syringe, single-dose vial and
multi-dose vials (Cummings et al., 2019).
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Table 4.5 DTaP Contract Prices for PAHO**

Year

Price

2010

$10.00*

2011

$10.00

2012

$10.50

2013

$10.80

2014

$8.00

2015

$12.00

2016

$12.80

2017

$15.00

* The price in 2010 is an estimate from the price in 2011.
** The annual contracted prices of Infanrix and Daptacel through 2011-2017
are obtained from PAHO (2018).
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4.3.5

Estimation of Total Production Capacity

In this model, we assume symmetric production capacity for both manufacturers. In other words, GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi Pasteur, have the
same amount of production capacity for Infanrix and Daptacel, respectively.
However, since the total production capacity is not publicly available, we
let the sum of total demand for the U.S. and Paraguay be the production
capacity as it is expected that a manufacturer does not produce more than
the total market demand (Cummings et al., 2019).

4.3.6

Estimation of Target Profit

We assume that PAHO ensures a satisfactory profit for each manufacturer
to stay in business, to avoid monopoly in the market. Cummings et al.
(2019) use the previous year’s demand and prices as the target profit for the
following year :
Pm, y 


D y−1  pub
priv
· x i p m, y−1 + (1 − x i )p m, y−1
2

m∈M

Cummings et al. (2019) obtained the profit in 2018 from the U.S. market
to be $39.8M for GlaxoSmithKline and $45.1M for Sanofi Pasteur. Using the
same approach, we estimate the target profit in the Paraguayan market to
be $0.39M for GlaxoSmithKline and $0.34M for Sanofi Pasteur. Since Pm
for a given manufacturer m ∈ M is the sum of profits made from both U.S.
and Paraguay, we obtain the target profit in 2018 for GlaxoSmithKline to be
$40.2M and $45.4M for Sanofi Pasteur. As in Cummings et al. (2019), we can
validate that these are reasonable target profits by comparing these values
to each manufacturer’s estimated R&D expenses. Cummings et al. (2019)
estimates the R&D costs to be $33.4M and $43.1M for GlaxoSmithKline and
Sanofi Pasteur respectively. Thus, because our target profit values are greater
than the R&D costs, this serves as a validation that the target profit values
are reasonable.

4.3.7

Estimation of Private Sector Capacity Lower Bound

Finally, this section discusses the private sector parameter U i , which is
needed to assume BC equilibrium. We use the equation that Cummings
et al. (2019) provide:
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Ui 



priv

ai

(1 + γ)
γ

2(1 − γ)1/2

 
· 1−


i∈I

(1 + γ)1/2 (2 − γ)

This concludes the estimations of the parameters. The summary is
presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Summarized Parameter Values

Model Component

U.S.

Paraguay

Di

4.34M*

0.39M***

xi

0.57*

0.685****

pub



1.365 +

1.553
1+γ



× 106 *



1.365 +

1.114
1+γ



× 105

priv



1.030 +

2.389
1+γ



× 106 *



0.628 +

1.839
1+γ



× 105

ai
ai

µ*

10−4

10−4

γ*

(0, 0.5)

(0, 0.5)

K in f , K dap **

4.42M

4.42M

Pin f , Pdap **

$40.2M, $45.4M

$40.2M, $45.4M

* The parameter estimates for the U.S. come from Cummings et al. (2019).
** The production capacity and target profit have been adjusted to fit the
two-economy model, using the methods from Cummings et al. (2019).
*** The demand estimate for Paraguay is obtained from the UN (2019).
**** x i for Paraguay is obtained from Kieninger et al. (2015).

Chapter 5

Results
The goal of this analysis is to gain insights on the vaccine pricing dynamics in
a two-economy duopoly, that will inform pricing strategy for agencies such
as PAHO who negotiate vaccine prices on behalf of many countries. Section
5.1 describes the mathematical programming from which the solutions are
obtained. Section 5.2 discusses the empirical results.

5.1

Mathematical Programming

The Network Enabled Opimization System (NEOS) server is a free internetbased service for numerical optimization problems, providing access to more
than 60 types of solvers (Wisconsin Institute for Discovery at the University
of Wisconsin in Madison, 2019). Among those solvers, the Branch-AndReduce Optimization Navigator (BARON) solves purely continuous, purely
integer, and mixed integer nonlinear problems (NEOS Servor, 2019). The
optimization model and the necessary case study data were formulated in
A Mathematical Programming Language (AMPL) and were submitted to
BARON to obtain solutions.

5.2

Solutions for the Model

Cross subsidization is a pricing strategy to subsidize a product from the
profits of other products, usually within a firm or a manufacturer. This
strategy allows the manufacturer to offer a lower pricing point for the
targeted consumer segment. In the context of the case study from Chapter
4, the concept of cross subsidization can be applied to PAHO’s vaccine
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Table 5.1 The Price and Quantity Output for the Public Sectors of the U.S. and
Paraguay

γ  0.25

Infanrix

Daptacel

US

Paraguay

Price

$4.53

$11.64

Quantity

2.368M

0.13M

Net Cost

$10.73M

$1.54M

Price

$9.14

$11.63

Quantity

1.75M

0.13M

Net Cost

$16.03M

$1.54M

$26.76M

$3.08M

Total PAHO Cost

procurement process by lowering the total cost of DTaP vaccines for the
low income country (Paraguay), sustained by a higher total cost for the
high income country (US). In this case, the cross subsidization is rather
indirect, and is possible due to the large amount of vaccines that PAHO must
purchase to meet the U.S. demand.
With the default value of product similarity at γ  0.25, the optimal
pricing solution is presented in the Table 5.1. It compares the DTaP price
and quantity allocation between the two countries. The net cost is obtained
by multiplying its price and quantity.
Recall from Chapter 3 that the objective function of the model is to
minimize the total PAHO cost while meeting all the constraints. Thus, the
values obtained are the costs of vaccines only applicable to the public sector,
given the parameter inputs. In order to validate this model, we compare the
price output with the actual prices of DTaP vaccines in 2018.
The true contracted prices of Infanrix and Daptacel in the U.S. public
sector are $18.19 and $17.61 respectively (Cummings et al., 2019). For the
price in Paraguay, the weighted average cost of the pediatric DTaP is $15.00
(PAHO, 2018). From this weighted average, we estimate the Paraguay’s
public sector prices for each vaccine using the price difference percentage
in the U.S. The calculated prices of Infanrix and Daptacel in Paraguay are
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$15.18 and $14.81 respectively. The direct comparison for the prices are
shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Comparison of Estimated Price and True Price for DTaP

Recall that a sensitivity analysis was conducted on few selected product
similarity values. Figure 5.2 presents the results of predicted prices in the
U.S. market. The range of Infanrix price is from $3.79 to $17.87, while the
range of Daptacel price is from $5.55 to $10.48. As we can see, the price
generally increases as product similarity increases. This is an unexpected
result that does not accurately capture the market since, in most cases, a
manufacturer would have to decrease the price as its product is more similar
to the competing products in the market. A sensitivity analysis on few
selected product similarity values in the Paraguayan market shows a similar
result as that of the U.S. market.
The predicted prices are lower than the actual contracted prices. However, this is somewhat an expected outcome as the previous models from
Cummings et al. (2019) and Behzad and Jacobson (2016) also had output
prices lower than the actual prices. For example, in the model from Cummings et al. (2019), the predicted prices for Infanrix and Daptacel in the
public sector of the U.S. were $18.62 and $8.45 respectively. Cummings
et al. (2019) attribute one of the factors for the lower approximation to be
the model’s characterization of the government. Similarly, in this model,
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Figure 5.2

Range of the Predicted DTaP Price in the U.S.

PAHO is the central institution that the optimization is solved for, with the
only specified objective being minimizing the net cost. Because PAHO is a
complex institution, serving beyond the two countries, there may be other
objectives of PAHO that contributes in higher contract prices. Furthermore,
lack of tacit collusion assumption is another factor that Cummings et al. (2019)
suspects. It refers to the pricing strategy in which firms seek higher profits
than Bertrand behavior permits by setting higher prices until a competing
firm lowers its price (Robbins et al., 2013). Lastly, the DTaP prices in Paraguay
are estimates using the U.S. price difference of two products’ prices - where
the market characteristics differ vastly from that of Paraguay’s vaccine market.
This assumption may have contributed in the underestimation of the prices.
While the general underestimation of the prices was expected and
explained in the previous paragraph, the substantial difference in the DTaP
vaccine prices between the U.S. and Paraguay is an unforeseen result. As
shown in Table 5.1, Infanrix is predicted to cost $4.53 in the U.S. and $11.64
in Paraguay. Similarly, Daptacel is predicted to cost $9.14 and $11.63 in
Paraguay. This is the opposite of the desired cross-subsidization effect.
This result may be attributed to a possible flaw in the model, specifically
in the objective function. Because the objective function minimizes total
public sector cost, and since the volume of the U.S. market is so large, it may
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Figure 5.3

PAHO Total Spending Segmented (%)

have returned a solution that prioritizes lowering the prices in the U.S. The
proportion of the U.S. market in total PAHO spending is shown in Figure 5.3
to emphasize the volume of the U.S. market. Considering that PAHO’s net
spending is around $30M, 90% of the net cost is spent on purchasing DTaP
vaccines for the U.S. This matter is further discussed in Conclusion.
While considering the possible flaw in the model, the output results for
the U.S. market imply that it benefited through PAHO’s vaccine procurement
compared to the independent vaccine procurement through CDC. The direct
comparison is shown in Figure 5.4. The predicted DTaP prices from the
PAHO model were lower than the predicted DTaP prices from the U.S.only model in Cummings et al. (2019). While Daptacel procured by CDC
is slightly cheaper ($8.45) than Daptacel procured by PAHO ($9.14), the
price difference in Infanrix is much larger. The predicted Infanrix price
procured by CDC is $18.62 and the same product procured by PAHO is $4.53
(Cummings et al., 2019). This analysis for Paraguay is omitted as we do not
have a Paraguay-only model for comparison.
While PAHO’s vaccine procurement provided the U.S. market with a
lower price, we must consider the possible flaw discussed in the previous
paragraph. Again, this result may be attributed the flaw in the objective
function, as it may have prioritized returning a lower cost in the large market
at the expense of higher costs in the small market.
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Figure 5.4

DTaP Price Comparison by Procurement Agent

*The predicted Infanrix and Daptacel costs procured through CDC is from
Cummings et al. (2019).

Solutions for the Model
To conclude, the output of the model presented some unexpected results.
For example, the cross-subsidization occurred in the opposite direction, from
Paraguay to the U.S. While this is an undesirable result, it still validates idea
that some form of cross-subsidization occurs in PAHO vaccine procurement.
When the direction of the cross-subsidization is reversed, from a high
income country to a low income country, it could contribute in providing a
lower price for the low income country, ultimately improving the vaccine
accessibility.

Chapter 6

Conclusion
In this work, we presented an optimization problem to observe the vaccine
pricing dynamics in a two-economy duopoly from the perspective of a
centralized procurement agency, such as PAHO. The objectives of the model
are : (1) minimizing the total government cost (2) ensuring a satisfactory
profit for all manufacturers (3) meeting all demands from both countries.
The model is a direct extension of the existing work of Cummings et al.
(2019) that models one-economy duopoly in the U.S.
We formulated a case study in order to validate the model. The model was
applied to the DTaP duopoly in the U.S. and Paraguay, procured by PAHO.
The results of the case study provided some interesting insights for the
pricing dynamics in two countries. The inversely proportional relationship
of price and quantity is well-known and highly applicable to many real cases.
The relationship still holds for PAHO’s vaccine procurement mechanism,
as PAHO is responsible for purchasing a large sum of vaccines to meet all
demands from member countries. With the decreased prices following the
inverse relationship, we incorporated the idea of cross-subsidization within
PAHO. However, it is important to acknowledge that there exists a possible
flaw in the model as the output prices presented a significantly cheaper
price for Infanrix in the U.S. than that of Infanrix in Paraguay. This is the
opposite of the desired result as the cross-subsidization occurred in favor
of the high income country. While considering this flaw, the model output
was directly compared with one-economy model results. The comparison
implied that the U.S. market benefits from a cheaper price through PAHO’s
vaccine procurement. Thus, in order for PAHO to purchase vaccines at
the lowest price possible and initiate the subsidization process, it is of best
interests for PAHO to maintain countries with high demand as members.
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Moreover, it has been shown that some form of cross-subsidization does
occur in PAHO vaccine procurement. When the cross-subsidization occurs
in the desired direction, from a high income country to a low income country,
it could contribute in improving the vaccine accessibility for a low income
country.
One of the limitations of this work is that the public/private sector
healthcare system observed in the U.S. is relatively rare in the countries
served by PAHO. As such, the U.S./Paraguay comparison used here is
not a perfect analogy for the sorts of negotiations that PAHO would use.
Thus, a potential work could include extending the model to have more
flexibility in the healthcare structure of the selected countries or the type
of vaccines. As Cummings et al. (2019) writes, this model separates a huge
market into one antigen. In reality, the pediatric vaccine market is layered
with many intertwined relationships between different types of vaccines
and manufacturers. Future work could incorporate this matter in an attempt
to more accurately capture the vaccine market.
Recall that the predicted DTaP prices from the model were substantially
less than the true contracted price. We suspect flaws in some of the parameter
estimation methods. For instance, the price difference (%) between the public
sector and private sector of the U.S. was used to calculate the parameters of
Paraguay. More careful execution of formulating these assumptions may
positively affect obtaining an accurate portrayal of the pricing dynamics.
Moreover, a revision in the objective function should be considered in order
to investigate the ironic results of cross-subsidization. For example, the
public sector costs can be weighted by the inverse GDP of each country in
the objective function.
Another potential future work using this model could investigate a unique
duopoly of a monovalent HPV vaccine in the global pharmaceutical market,
namely Cervarix and Gardasil. As the awareness for HPV vaccination is
growing exponentially across the globe, it may be beneficial to study the HPV
vaccine procurement through PAHO or other public health organizations.
Maintaining the two-economy model between a high income country and a
low income country could be used to also incorporate important cultural
contexts that are often overlooked in research.
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